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Direct Employment of Skilled Labour by Foreign Owned Subsidiaries 
and the Development of Autonomy and Intra and Inter Organizational 
Relationships  
 
Abstract 
This paper develops a conceptual framework on the strategic development of 
subsidiaries and the direct employment of skilled labour. The framework is based on 
autonomy, and intra and inters organizational relationships. The conceptual model 
outlines the conditions that are likely to lead to too much, or too little, autonomy and intra 
and inter organizational relationships. This model is then used to develop propositions on 
the links between autonomy and intra and inter organizational relationships and direct 
employment of skilled labour.  
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Introduction 
The process of globalisation has generated a powerful backlash based on the view 
that the ruthless desire by multinational corporations (MNCs) to generate profits is 
leading to harmful effects on physical and social environments (Bakan, 2004; Mander 
and Goldsmith, 1997). The pursuit of profits, in a world increasingly open to international 
business transactions, is often regarded to be a major driver of the degradation of the 
physical environment, and the deskilling of large parts of the labour force and the 
lowering of wages as MNCs locate and re-locate their activities to lower labour cost 
countries. These factors are said to have led to costs that often outweigh the benefits of 
globalisation (Giddens, 2000: Hutton and Giddens, 2001; Korten, 2001). A strong case 
for the benefits of the globalisation process have been made by highlighting some of the 
omissions and under valuations of the benefits from increased international trade and 
investment that are often contained in the anti-globalisation case (Bhagwati, 2004). 
However, even advocates of the benefits of globalisation, have highlighted disadvantages 
from the globalisation process arising. These include the high adjustment costs that 
accompany the development of international trade and investment flows, which 
encourage firms, especially MNCs, to introduce new products, production processes, and 
to locate their operations on a global basis (Stiglitz, 2003). These adjustment costs, it is 
argued, often fall on labour as globalisation leads to large-scale redundancies and the loss 
of demand for skilled labour as operations are located and relocated to lower labour cost 
locations (Hutton and Giddens, 2001).  
The impact of direct foreign investments (DFI) on employment has been 
examined (Barrell and Pain, 1997; Driffield and Taylor, 2000; Driffield and Munday, 
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2000; Lim, 2001). These studies examine direct employment (labour directly employed 
by foreign owned subsidiaries) but especially indirect employment (labour employed by 
other companies that is associated with DFI inflows – spillover employment effects). 
These macroeconomic studies established that, in general, positive employment effects in 
host locations emerge from DFI inflows. However, these surveys rarely concentrate on 
skilled employment effects though Velde (2003) provided the insight, through an 
investigation of British establishments using microelectronic technologies, that foreign-
owned establishments – compared to domestic companies – typically were early adopters 
of new technologies and in general employed more non-manual workers. Moreover, the 
literature on DFI and employment effects tends to neglect the type of strategic issues 
associated with the strategic development of foreign owned subsidiaries. There are a few 
studies that have investigated the direct employment effects associated with increased 
autonomy and the development of embeddedness in host locations (McDonald, et al., 
2003; Tüselmann, et al., 2003). These studies find that in foreign owned subsidiaries in 
the UK that increased autonomy and the development of intra and inter organizational 
relationships are associated with enhanced employment of skilled labour, such as 
professional and managerial staff, technicians, and skilled craftsmen. Furthermore, Holm, 
et al. (2003) found that access to skillful personnel was negatively related to headquarters 
control, though positively related to the subsidiary competence level. However, there are 
no well-developed conceptual frameworks on the links between the strategic 
development of subsidiaries and direct skilled employment effects. This means that it is 
difficult to set research agendas that can help to increase our understanding on the 
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employment implications of changing the organizational and management structures of 
the subsidiaries of MNCs, and of the regional development implications of such changes.  
The international business literature suggests that the strategic objectives of 
MNCs are likely to have significant implications for subsidiary development and by 
extension on employment in host locations. Resource-based theories of MNCs indicate 
that they seek to strategically develop some of their subsidiaries by granting them 
autonomy to embed into their host locations by establishing links with other firms and 
agencies to acquire desirable assets and knowledge that help to promote the objectives of 
companies (Andersson et al., 2002; Andersson and Forsgren, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 
1998; Moore, 2001).  
Another distinguishing characteristic of foreign subsidiaries is that they have 
significant intra and inter-organizational relationships. Intra-organizational relations are 
the links that the subsidiary has with the headquarters and other subsidiaries within the 
MNC. Inter-organizational relations are the links that the subsidiary has in its host 
location and including, customers, suppliers, competitors and supporting agencies such as 
governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. These concepts can be considered as 
internal environments - intra-organizational relationships, and external environments - 
inter-organizational relationships (Birkinshaw, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 2005; Holm et 
al., 2003). Although increasing autonomy and the development of intra and inter 
organizational relationships are not necessarily linked to beneficial affects for host 
locations (Young and Tavares, 2004) or for the MNC as a whole (Almeida et al., 2004; 
Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), developing subsidiaries by granting mandates to make 
strategic decisions and to expand operations and to extend intra and inter organizational 
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relationships are potentially important elements for the performance of subsidiaries and 
subsequently for their impact on direct skilled employment in host locations.  
This paper develops a conceptual framework on the strategic development of 
subsidiaries and the direct employment of skilled labour. The framework is based on 
autonomy (decision rights for strategy issues and for operational matters), and intra and 
inters organizational relationships. The conceptual model outlines the conditions that are 
likely to lead to too much, or too little, autonomy and intra and inter organizational 
relationships. This model is then used to develop propositions on the links between 
autonomy and intra and inter organizational relationships and direct employment of 
skilled labour.      
 
Literature Review on Subsidiary Development Effects on Autonomy 
and Inter/Intra Organisational Relationships 
 
Initially, autonomy can be defined as “the degree to which the foreign subsidiary 
of the MNC has strategic and operational decision making authority” (O’Donnell, 2000, 
p. 528). Emphasis is put on the strategic role of the subsidiary, and how it influences 
decision making processes on an overall level in the MNC, and simultaneously its 
freedom to conduct daily business activities without asking for permission (Birkinshaw et 
al., 2005). In general autonomy reflects how the subsidiary can make a “range of 
decisions without interference from headquarters”, as measured by Birkinshaw et al. 
(2005, p. 237). 
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Defining subsidiary relationships: Intra organizational relationships are connected 
to the internal business environment (that is, the relationships within the MNC) of foreign 
owned subsidiaries. Whereas inter organizational relationships are based on the external 
business environment of subsidiaries in their host locations. Both of these relationships 
exert influences on the performance and, therefore, the employment effects of foreign 
owned subsidiaries. Intra organizational relationships are based on relationships with 
suppliers, customers and competing entities within the MNC (Birkinshaw et al., 2005) 
that indicates a competing as well as a collaborative internal arena. They have also been 
identified with intra-organizational networks (Holm and Pedersen, 2000; Holm, et al., 
2003; Schmid and Schurig, 2003). 
The foundation of subsidiary development is also of interest, since these processes 
obviously influences decisions concerning employment on the one hand, and autonomy 
and relationships on the other. The level and type of strategic development subsidiaries is 
an outcome of assignment by head office, decisions taken by subsidiary management, and 
local market conditions (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997; Crookell and Morrison, 1990; 
Hood and Taggart, 1999; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Therefore, the role of 
subsidiaries, and as an effect, the type of individuals they employ, is not just a reflection 
of the external business environment, but also an outcome of strategic choices of 
headquarters and subsidiary managers (Morrison and Roth, 1993).  
Subsidiary managers are therefore more than just executive organs of a given 
business environment, they also influence the behaviour of headquarters and other 
subsidiaries. Given the large behavioural differences between national and expatriate 
managers (Peterson, 2003), the level of autonomous action of a subsidiary also depends 
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on whether the subsidiary is managed by a local manager or an expatriate. To give one 
example, a study made by Blazejewski and Dorow (2003), showed that subsidiaries 
managed by expatriates were more likely to develop its mandates over time. The 
behaviour of both subsidiary and headquarters’ managers can also be influenced by 
individual career orientation (Schein, 1993), a variable that varies according to age, 
family status, firm-specific career opportunities, and other factors.  
Given that subsidiary development is a contested issue in most MNCs, the 
reputation gained in former conflicts (Pfeffer, 1992), the specific allocation of “zones of 
uncertainty” (Crozier and Friemann, 1979) and organizational politics (Dlugos, et al., 
1993) should also be taken into consideration. This is especially true in the case of 
mergers and acquisitions where relatively unknown entities join the MNC’s network of 
subsidiaries. The MNC is, so to say, also a political oriented organization (Forsgren, 
1989), and organizations and sub-organizations behave in accordance with their self-
interest (Schmidt and Kochan, 1977). In their seminal paper, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1988) 
provided one example hereof, since they only saw indirect effects of autonomy on 
innovation. Consequently, autonomy leads to conflicts and needed to be mediated by 
normal integration, i.e. shared organizational values, and communication, before 
influencing innovation. Autonomy is then associated with the subsidiary cooperation with 
headquarters (Taggart, 1999) like shown by Picard (1980) were good relationships among 
executives increased operational flexibility. 
Furthermore, autonomy and the level of intra and inter organizational 
relationships is often reflected by the role – i.e. the scale and scope of activity, 
geographical market orientation, and strategic responsibilities - subsidiaries play in the 
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MNC. This can range from a miniature replica, a duplicated microcosm of the 
headquarters that produces and markets some of the parent’s products, to a strategic 
independent unit with the freedom and resources to develop products for global markets 
(Poynter and White, 1985). The reason for this multiplicity is the differentiation in the 
resources possessed by subsidiaries that derive dissimilar roles and responsibilities. In 
addition the size, the history and geography of MNCs varies a lot including both simple 
and complex organisational structures (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997). 
The effects of these factors on host locations depends on whether the subsidiaries 
remain stable, or whether strategic development leads to an extension or demotion of 
subsidiary business activities. A survey by Jarillo and Martínez (1990) revealed that some 
subsidiaries become more enmeshed into intra-organizational activities over time. A 
follow up study by Taggart (1998b; 1998c) confirms the result. Another study, building 
on Poynter and White (1985), terminology, found that 40 % of subsidiaries with lower 
level strategic autonomy experience an upgrade in responsibilities within a 5 year period 
(Taggart, 1999).   
Increasing autonomy and intra and inter organizational relationships is often 
assumed to be a prerequisite for significant beneficial effects in host locations (Edwards, 
et al., 2002). However, increasing autonomy and intra and inter organizational 
relationships need not lead to benefits to the MNC because of rent-seeking behaviour by 
subsidiaries (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004) and failure to optimize the balance in 
managing the utilization of knowledge and assets in the internal and external 
environments (Almeida and Phene, 2004). Here, subsidiaries are said to be living in a 
world of institutional duality (Kostova and Roth, 2002) meeting simultaneously 
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requirements from internal and external institutions. Moreover, a fine line may have to 
tread between cooperation and competition in intra organizational relationships if harmful 
competition between subsidiaries is to be avoided (Birkinshaw et al., 2005). It appears 
that effective management of both internal and external business environments, 
developing an optimal balance between centralized and decentralized control strategies, 
and the existence of desirable assets in host locations are crucial to making the strategic 
development of subsidiaries work (Davis and Meyer, 2004; Luo, 2005; Schmid and 
Schurig, 2003; Young and Tavares, 2005). Figure 1 summarises the reasons for too 
much, or too little autonomy and intra and inter organizational relationships.  
 (Figure 1 about here) 
 
Autonomy and Skilled Employment  
Autonomy has been identified as one of the most important areas of research in 
cases where the subsidiary is the unit of analysis (Paterson and Brock, 2002). Resource-
based theorists have extensively studied the process of autonomy granted to subsidiaries 
in host locations (Andersson, et al.; 2002; Birkinshaw, et al., 1998; Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998; Holm and Pedersen, 2000; Jarillo and Martinez, 1990). The importance of 
autonomy in subsidiary development has also been investigated using the concept of 
procedural justice (Kim and Mauborgne, 1993; Taggart, 1996). In general, these studies 
find that good performance in subsidiaries is related to high levels of autonomy in host 
locations. Autonomy helps the subsidiary to build up unique and distinguishable 
knowledge positions by tapping into external networks not accessed by other entities in 
the MNC. Some studies show a positive relationship between subsidiary autonomy and 
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knowledge creation (Taggart 1997; Taggart and Hood 1999), but opposite results have 
also been found by Brockhoff and Schmaul (1996) and Ensign et al. (2000). Finally, 
autonomy reflects the diversity of the MNC. Here, Garnier (1982) found that large and 
diverse MNC granted less autonomy to subsidiaries, in order to impose control and 
minimize risk. At the same time, subsidiaries needed skillful personnel and freedom to 
operate in institutional different environments (Prahalad & Doz, 1981) or in the case of 
diversified organizational structure (Vachani, 1999).  
Increased autonomy and the effects on direct employment of skilled labour in host 
locations can be split into two main components (see Figure 2). Firstly, the autonomy in 
strategic decisions rights and secondly autonomy related to operational decision making. 
Strategic decision right is concerned with mandates to make decisions in areas such as 
R&D, production system developments, product developments, and marketing 
developments. Secondly, operational decision rights involve the right to make tactical 
decisions on the type and extent of daily operations. Autonomy granted to subsidiaries 
differentiates in relation to activity (Birkinshaw, 1999; Birkinshaw and Hood, 2000; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2005; Ghoshal et al., 1994; Gupta et al., 1999; Holm and Pedersen, 
2000; Roth and Morrison, 1992; Taggart, 1999), as found in a survey by Vachani (1999) 
where subsidiary autonomy was greater for marketing and personnel decisions than for 
R&D and finance. Subsidiaries will, typically, have greater information on operational 
issues, and operations like setting wage rates and determining the number of employees 
were in Edwards et al.’ (2002) sample in most cases solely made by the subsidiary, 
whereas strategic decisions regarding the approve of finance for major projects were 
made by headquarters. 
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In cases where there is too little autonomy (see figure 2), expanding autonomy by 
granting increased mandates to develop markets, products, production processes and 
R&D should lower transaction costs because of the shorter chain command and should 
enhance the ability to explore new and innovative arrangements that involve higher 
valued added activities in both internal and external business environments. As Prahalad 
and Doz (1981) - suggesting a relationship between subsidiary maturity and its ability to 
afford higher levels of management and investments in R&D - we believe that the 
increase in explorative activities demand for a higher proportion of skilled labour1 to 
carry out R&D activities, developing new markets and products, engaging in innovation, 
and in general to manage the growth of the establishment. This line of reasoning leads to 
our first proposition.      
 
Proposition 1a 
 
Subsidiaries that are granted increased strategic decision rights autonomy develop 
enhanced abilities to innovate and experience lower transaction costs, which leads to 
increased direct employment of skilled labour.  
 
 
In general, subsidiaries with weak mandates, like Greenfield sales subsidiaries, do 
not have the autonomy to hire key personnel (Holm et al., 2003). Likewise, in cases 
where too much autonomy has been granted (see figure 2) there will be reduction in 
autonomy, which will lead to curtailment of certain types of higher valued added 
activities. This, if widespread will lead to no growth in direct employment of skilled 
labour. Demotion of subsidiary mandates will, at least in the short run, lead to reductions 
                                                          
1 Increases in autonomy, and in intra and inter organizational relationships, may increase or decrease the 
overall level of employment, for example an increase in autonomy or the development of intra and inter 
organizational relationships may induce subsidiary managers to rationalize activities away from lower 
valued operations and thereby reduce the overall level of employment.      
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in the non-skilled employees, though widespread and charter losses of long duration will 
lead to skilled employment cut backs.  
 
Proposition 1b 
 
Subsidiaries that have a reduction in strategic decision rights autonomy will curtail some 
higher value added activities, which if widespread will lead to no growth in direct 
employment of skilled labour, and if persistent will lead to reductions in employment of 
skilled labour.     
 
 
 (Figure 2 about here) 
 
Increases in autonomy in operational decision rights should create opportunities 
for internal economies of scale and scope as well as learning effects as subsidiaries 
develop their operations using the autonomy that they have been granted in these areas 
(see Figure 2). As shown by Edwards et al., (2002), these rights typically concerns 
decisions concerning employment, and, therefore, we advocate for the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 2a 
 
Subsidiaries that are granted increased operational decision rights autonomy will expand 
the type and extent of their activities that will enhances internal economies of scale and 
scope, which leads to increased direct employment of skilled labour.   
 
 
In cases where too much operational autonomy has been granted (see figure 2) 
there will be reduction in autonomy, which will lead to curtailment of certain types of 
higher valued added activities. This, if widespread will lead to no growth in direct 
employment of skilled labour. As in the case of strategic decision rights autonomy 
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continuation of reduced autonomy may permit the headquarters to accelerate 
rationalization processes that will lead to a decline in the employment of skilled labour.     
        
Proposition 2b  
 
Subsidiaries that have a reduction in operational decision rights autonomy will curtail 
some higher value added activities, which if widespread will lead to no growth in direct 
employment of skilled labour, and if persistent will lead to reductions in employment of 
skilled labour.     
 
 
Intra and Inter Organizational Relationships and Skilled Labour 
Intra and Inter organizational relationships provide the means to access resources 
within the MNC that can increase organizational learning (Lundvall, 1999), lower 
transactions costs and build up of trust in intra-organizational activities (Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998a; Dunning, 2000; Hennart, 2001) and increase access to information and 
knowledge (Holm et al., 2005; Schmid and Schurig, 2003). Accessing technological 
knowledge that can enhance capabilities to innovate is often regarded as being the major 
benefits that arises from intra organizational relationships (Ivarsson, 2002; 
Papanastassiou and Pearce 1997; Pearce, 1999; Taggart, 1998a). Figure 3 provides a 
summary of the relationship between intra organizational relationships and direct 
employment of skilled labour.  
 
 (Figure 3 about here) 
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In general, wide (large number of intra organizational relationships) and depth 
(large frequency of intra organizational relationships) are likely to be associated with 
good subsidiary performance. This leads to the third proposition.    
 
Proposition 3a 
 
Subsidiaries that develop wide and deep intra organizational relationships will 
experience increased organizational learning, lower transaction cost, higher levels of 
trust in intra organizational activities, and access to desirable assets from within the 
MNC, which leads to increased direct employment of skilled labour. 
 
In cases where too much intra organizational relationships have been developed 
(see Figure 3) there will be reduction in these relationships, which will lead to 
curtailment of certain types of higher valued added activities. This, if widespread will 
lead to no growth in direct employment of skilled labour, and if long lasting will induce 
reductions in the employment of skilled labour.       
 
Proposition 3b  
 
Subsidiaries that have a reduction in width and depth of intra organizational 
relationships will curtail some higher value added activities, which if widespread will 
lead to no growth in direct employment of skilled labour, and if persistent will lead to 
reductions in employment of skilled labour.     
 
Inter organizational relationships are those connections that exist within the 
external business environment in host locations of foreign owned subsidiaries, and 
embrace product and capital flows on the one hand, and transfers of information on the 
other (Andersson et al., 2002). The importance of inter organizational relationships is 
highlighted by the value attached to locating within local networks to develop 
international competitiveness. This has been investigated in terms of the role of 
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geographical factors in the internationalisation process (Dunning, 2000; Porter, 1990 and 
1994). This literature indicates that the use of local networks composed of other firms, 
R&D agencies such as universities and government research bodies, local authority 
agencies, chambers of commerce and other organisations can help subsidiaries to attain 
their objectives. These local networks enhance the ability to attain collective learning and 
innovation benefits (Lundvall, 1999) and to acquire spill over benefits associated with 
proximity (Porter and Sölvell, 1999). These network benefits form the basis for 
agglomeration benefits. Local networks that provide such benefits are at the core of 
clusters or industrial districts that have been shown to deliver competitive advantages to 
foreign owned subsidiaries that locate in these geographical concentrations (Benito, 
2000; Driffield and Munday, 2000; Enright, 2000; McNaughton and Green, 2002). 
Typically, subsidiaries in such leading edge clusters will be more embedded and – 
because of increased resource dependency for headquarters – be granted more autonomy 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Prahalad and Doz, 1981). These 
benefits of external relationships arise from external economies of scale, increased 
flexibility from proximity to suppliers, customers, and supporting agencies. Moreover, 
acquisition of desirable locally available assets should be enhanced because of the use of 
inter organizational networks.       
Subsidiaries that are strongly embedded in inter organizational relationships are 
more likely than lightly embedded subsidiaries to develop competitiveness and to engage 
in high value added operations and, thereby, to have more beneficial effects in host 
locations. Such embeddedness can enhance the effectiveness of both backward linkages 
(to suppliers and agencies that enable effective input supply) and forward linkages (to 
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buyers and agencies that help in the process of marketing and selling). Further, benefits 
can arise from increased abilities in gathering and processing information that leads to 
acquisition of knowledge. This type of knowledge acquisition can lead to competitive 
advantages for the MNC (Davis and Meyer, 2004; Schmid and Schurig, 2003). Although 
little evidence has been found that high levels of embeddedness in inter organizational 
relationships are linked to beneficial effects in host locations (Tüselmann et al., 2000; 
McDonald et al., 2003 and 2004), in principle, if inter organizational relationships 
improve the effectiveness of backward and forward linkages this should have a beneficial 
impact on direct employment of skilled labour in host locations (see Figure 3). However, 
such beneficial effects are likely to be dependent on the strategic objectives of 
subsidiaries and the headquarters of the MNC and the amount and quality of locally 
available assets that can be harnessed by developing inter organizational relationships. 
Subsidiary managers must also be able to convince headquarters and other major decision 
makers within the MNC that developing inter organizational relationships will bring 
benefits to those parts of the MNC that are considered to be central to the corporate 
strategy of the firm. Further, the depth and the frequency of interactions with local 
partners further increases these effect. This is embraced in the concept of embeddedness, 
and includes the level of trust, and the willingness to adapt resources and procedures in 
both organizations leading to a close relationship. Here, Andersson et al., (2002) find a 
positive correlation between external embeddedness (regarding technical and business 
relationships) and subsidiary market performance. Following this argumentation, we 
believe that the wide (large number of inter organizational relationships) and depth (large 
frequency of inter organizational relationships) are likely to be associated with good 
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subsidiary performance in cases where there is too little inter organizational relationships 
(see Figure3). This leads to proposition four.  
     
Proposition 4a 
 
Subsidiaries that develop wide and deep inter organizational relationships will 
experience improved abilities to gather and process information, stimulate learning and 
innovation, and improve the assets available to the subsidiary, which leads to direct 
employment of skilled labour. 
  
 
In cases where too much inter organizational relationships have been developed 
(see Figure 3) there will be reduction in these relationships, which will lead to 
curtailment of certain types of higher valued added activities. This, if widespread will 
lead to no growth in direct employment of skilled labour, and a prolonged retreat from 
such inter organizational relationships will reduce higher value added activities and 
thereby lead to a decline in the employment of skilled labour.      
 
Proposition 4b  
 
Subsidiaries that have a reduction in the width and depth of inter organizational 
relationships will curtail some higher value added activities, which if widespread will 
lead to no growth in direct employment of skilled labour, and if persistent will lead to 
reductions in employment of skilled labour.     
     
  
Links Between Autonomy, Intra and Inter Organizational 
Relationships, and Skilled Labour 
In this paper, we advocate, that in certain conditions, there will be a positive 
connection between subsidiary development (i.e. increase in autonomy, internal, and 
external relationships) and increases in the employment of skilled labour. However, 
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autonomy and networks are interdependent variables, and their mutual influence needs to 
be investigated. Thus far we have assumed that there are no links between changes in 
autonomy and changes in intra and inter organizational relationships. However, both top 
down and bottom up effects may be at work to link these factors. Top down effects are 
when changes in autonomy granted by headquarters to subsidiaries permit them to 
develop beneficial intra and inter organization relationships. Bottom up effects exist 
when the development of intra and inter organizational relationships initiated by 
managers in subsidiaries lead to the granting of autonomy by headquarters. 
Top down effects exist when increases in autonomy influence intra and inter 
organizational relationships because the ability to develop these relationships is often 
depended on subsidiary managers having the autonomy to develop these relationships 
(Almeida and Phene, 2004; Birkinshaw el al, 2004). In cases where autonomy leads to 
development of capabilities, upon which other corporate entities depend (like in the case 
of center of excellences, see Holm & Pedersen (2000)), more and frequent internal 
relationships will be established. A more direct effect is the subsidiary’s freedom to 
establish links to other subsidiaries, without asking for headquarters approval to do so 
(Edwards et al., 2002). Increase in autonomy practically lower the level of formal 
headquarters control, though the subsidiary will to a higher degree be governed though 
social control mechanisms, and in such cases, headquarters may still be highly influential 
on subsidiary decisions (Prahalad and Doz, 1981).  
Bottom up approaches involve entrepreneurial behavior by subsidiary managers 
whereby they engage in the development of intra and inter organizational relations, with 
or without permission from headquarters, that subsequently leads to good performance 
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that leads them being granted autonomy (Birkinshaw, 2000; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; 
Holm, et al., 2003; O’Donnell, 2000). This type of behavior has been especially evident 
in technological developments and in developing innovative procedures and processes 
(Davis and Meyer, 2004; Manolpoulos, et al., 2005; Papanastassiou and Pearce, 2005; 
Taggart, 1998a). However, in terms of control, Andersson and Forsgren (1996) found the 
effect of internal and external embeddedness to be contradictory, since subsidiaries 
perceived low degree of headquarters control when having high degree of external 
embeddedness, and opposite high degree of internal embeddedness led to high degree of 
perceived control by headquarters.       
Complex interactions between increasing autonomy and increasing intra and inter 
organizational relationships may be at work. In subsidiaries with too little autonomy and 
organizational relationships these interactions may lead to two-way interaction between 
increasing autonomy and intra and inter organizational relationships with subsequently 
boosting of direct employment of skilled labour. Alternatively, the link between 
autonomy and organizational relationships may be one way that is either top down, or 
bottom up. This is illustrated in Figure 4.     
 
 (Figure 4 about here) 
 
In cases where there is too little autonomy and/or intra and inter organizational 
relationships there will exist incentives for steps to be taken to increase these factors. 
This may come about by top down, or bottom up, or a complex interaction between these 
two approaches. Hence, there is likely to be links between increases in autonomy and 
increases in intra and inter organizational relationships. Enhancement of these factors will 
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lead to deeper and wider intra and inter organizational relationships, and increases in 
decision rights to make strategic choices and to extend and deepen operational activities. 
These changes will in turn lead to improvements in costs, learning and innovation, and in 
the quality of assets that will induce increases in higher value added activities. This will 
result in increases in direct employment of skilled labour. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 4, and leading to our fifth proposition: 
 
Proposition 5 
 
Interaction between autonomy and intra and inter organizational relationships may run 
from increased autonomy to increased organizational relationships, or run in the 
opposite direction, or flow in both directions. In cases where there is too little autonomy 
and/or organizational relationships the interaction will lead to increased direct 
employment of skilled labour. 
 
This conceptual framework provides a structure, as shown in figure 5, to construct 
research agendas that could be used to verify the postulated relationships that are derived 
from the framework, and also provide evidence on the strength of these relationships. 
Evidence of this kind would be helpful for managers in the headquarters of MNCs to 
assess the likely effect of developments in the autonomy and intra and inter 
organizational relationships of their subsidiaries. This type of evidence would also be 
useful for subsidiary managers, as it would provide guidance on some of the implications 
of developing autonomy and organizational relationships. Furthermore, the implications 
of too much autonomy and organizational relationships can be analyzed with this 
framework. This framework and empirical evidence derived from it could provide useful 
material for regional development planning because it could indicate likely effects for the 
direct employment of skilled labour in host locations of the strategic development of 
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foreign owned subsidiaries. Finally, empirical evidence derived from this conceptual 
framework could provide useful information to illuminate the debate about the impact of 
the globalization process on the host locations of foreign owned subsidiaries.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Conclusion 
The conceptual framework on links between autonomy and intra and inter 
organizational relationships with the subsequent link to direct employment effects, 
provides a route to engage in a comprehensive investigation of the direct employment 
effects in host locations of the development of foreign owned subsidiaries. This 
framework offers avenues of research on direct employment effects that could enhance 
the existing macroeconomic studies on the implications of DFI for employment in host 
locations. Therefore, this framework provides a route to develop research programmes 
that would add to our knowledge on this important issue. A research programme of this 
type would be valuable to managers in MNCs at both headquarters and subsidiary level, 
and for public policy makers to help them to create more effect regional development 
policies. Research using this type of an approach would also help us to have a better 
understanding of the complex interplay between autonomy and the internal and external 
environments of foreign owned subsidiaries.            
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Figure 1    Change in Autonomy and Intra and Inter Organizational 
Relationships    
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Figure 2 Increased Autonomy and Direct Employment of Skilled 
Labour  
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Figure 3 Increased Intra and Inter Organizational Relationships and 
Direct Employment of Skilled Labour  
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Figure 4 Interaction between autonomy and intra and inter 
organizational relationships and direct employment of skilled labour  
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Figure 5 
Model of Autonomy and Intra & Inter Organizational Relationships and Direct Employment of Skilled Labour 
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